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Abstract—The last decades have seen a growing interest in
hash functions that allow some sort of tolerance, e.g. for the
purpose of biometric authentication. Among these, the syndrome
fuzzy hashing construction allows to securely store biometric data
and to perform user authentication without the need of sharing
any secret key. This paper analyzes such a model, showing that
it offers a suitable protection against information leakage and
several advantages with respect to similar solutions, like the fuzzy
commitment scheme. The design and characterization of LDPC
codes to be used for this purpose is also addressed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of biometric passwords, such as fingerprints, irises,
etc., has been an important issue in recent years, both because
of the big advantages it may bring along and because of the
clearly non negligible privacy concerns and implementation
issues [1]. In fact, as far as privacy is concerned, the storage
of raw biometric data is not an acceptable solution, but, on the
other hand, a secure storage cannot be easily implemented,
as for traditional passwords, by simply introducing an hash
function. This is due to the fact that the binary strings derived
from different acquisitions of the same biometric feature can
slightly change from each other, and the biometric feature
can slightly change itself. Therefore a certain threshold of
tolerance is needed to be able to identify legitimate from non
legitimate users, but this prevents the standard use of collision
resistant hash functions [2].
This problem has prompted researchers to devise other
solutions for the secure storage and use of biometric passwords
(see [3] for a selected survey of the literature). The idea
behind most of these methods is a combined use of error
correcting codes and hash functions, whose model is the fuzzy
commitment scheme [4], which we revisit below. This has
been later generalized to other types of metrics, such as the
set difference metric [5] and the edit distance metric [6].
In particular, the fuzzy vault [5] uses polynomial interpo-
lation in order to allow authentication based on the matching
of a sufficient number of features, while the fuzzy extractor
[6] is a further generalization which combines the previous
constructions with particular objects called random extractors.
These make the previous schemes stronger with respect to
information leakage, though they cannot prevent it [7], [8].
Briefly, privacy and implementation issues are still a concern
and our aim is to give a further contribution, by showing that
a syndrome based fuzzy hashing is actually feasible and even
more convenient as far as information leakage is concerned.
First of all, we address the design of codes to be used within
this context, with focus on LDPC codes. Secondly, we study
the entropy of the fuzzy hashing output vectors and compare
it with the corresponding quantity of its input vectors.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we briefly
review the fuzzy commitment scheme and its main issues.
Section 3 is devoted to the syndrome based construction which
we denote by fuzzy hashing. Section 4 addresses the design
of codes to be used in this scheme. Section 5 is aimed at
analyzing the entropy of the output vectors, in order to assess
the performance of fuzzy hashing in terms of privacy.
II. PRIOR ART: THE PROTOTYPE
The fuzzy commitment scheme, proposed in [4], works
as follows. Suppose we want to securely store a length n
biometric vector x ∈ Fnq , where Fq is the Galois field of order
q, and let e be the maximum number of different symbols with
respect to the reference vector x that we can tolerate in any
other acquisition of the same biometric feature.
According to the fuzzy commitment scheme, we choose a
hash function Ha and an [n, k]-linear block code C ⊂ Fnq ,
able to correct e errors, and then store (Ha(rx), l), where rx
is a random codeword associated to x and l = x− rx.
Given another biometric y, we compute the vector z = y− l
and apply the decoding algorithm of C. If decoding succeeds,
this results in a codeword cz ∈ C, and we compute Ha(cz).
If Ha(cz) equals Ha(rx), i.e., the value previously stored, we
grant access, otherwise we deny it.
In fact, if the hashes are the same, then cz = rx (apart from
a negligible probability of a hash collision), so d(cz , z) =
d(rx, z) ≤ e, where d(·) denotes the Hamming distance. Since
rx = x− l and z = y − l, it results d(rx, z) = d(x, y) ≤ e.
Conversely, d(x, y) ≤ e implies d(x− l, y− l) = d(rx, z) ≤
e, so that decoding z results in cz = rx and Ha(cz) = Ha(rx).
In [2], we pointed out some of the main problems concern-
ing the use of this scheme, namely implementation issues and
security issues. In particular, privacy concerns may arise if
the biometric templates are not uniformly distributed in the
ambient space, that is their entropy is not maximal. In that
case, it may be feasible to infer from l some information about
rx and, therefore, endanger the system security.
III. SYNDROME FUZZY HASHING
Starting from the fuzzy commitment principle, an alterna-
tive scheme (here fuzzy hashing) can be devised, in which
syndromes are used in the place of codewords. Under a coding
theory viewpoint, the two schemes are equivalent. Despite this,
the use of syndromes has several advantages in the considered
context. The idea of storing the syndrome of x, instead of a
shift vector from a codeword, already appeared in [6], where
it is considered as an example of a sketch construction. We
will show that the use of fuzzy hashing is advantageous with
respect to the classical fuzzy commitment scheme, also by
considering the characteristics of typical biometric data.
In the fuzzy hashing scheme, an [n, k]-linear block code
C ⊂ Fnq , able to correct e errors, is selected, and it is described
through its r × n parity-check matrix H , with r = n − k.
Given a biometric vector x to be stored, the pair (Ha(x), Hx)
is used to represent x, were Ha is a given hash function.
When another biometric y is acquired and is compared with
x, the value Hx − Hy = H(x − y) = Hv is computed,
that coincides with the syndrome associated to the difference
vector v = x − y. Then, syndrome decoding is applied on
Hv, according to the chosen code C. If y is taken from the
same individual as x, then v has Hamming weight equal to
d(x, y) ≤ e and it corresponds to a correctable error vector. So,
syndrome decoding succeeds and correctly results in v. Then,
starting from v and y, x can be computed, as well as Ha(x).
The latter coincides with the stored value, so access is granted.
Otherwise, syndrome decoding fails or reports w 6= v. In such
case, x′ = w + y 6= x and Ha(x′) 6= Ha(x) is obtained, so
access is denied.
In the fuzzy commitment, the vector l = x − rx is
stored. As some bits of the biometric x might be known
with high probability, this reveals some information on the
secret codeword rx. The same may occur in fuzzy hashing,
where the syndrome Hx is stored, but only under the condition
x = q + rq , where q is a correctable error vector and rq is
any codeword. In this case, syndrome decoding results in q;
so, some bits of rq can still be guessed, starting from the
predictable bits of x. However, especially for very low rate
codes, the probability that x is within the decoding radius of
a codeword rq is very low, so fuzzy hashing provides better
security with respect to the classical fuzzy commitment.
IV. CODES FOR FUZZY HASHING
In order to design suitable codes to be included in the
fuzzy hashing scheme, we must consider the features of the
biometric vectors we work with. If we refer to fingerprints
or irises, a common acquisition will consist of a vector of
several thousands of bits. However, it would be unpractical
to apply fuzzy hashing directly on the plain acquisition, since
a number of impairments could jeopardize the identification
process. In fact, small changes in the acquisition conditions
(as ambient light or small movements of the subject) could
result in significant differences between two images of the
same biometric feature. So, a common procedure is to ex-
tract a set of representative features from the biometric data
through algorithms aimed at making them invariant to some
frequent acquisition impairments. An example of this kind of
algorithms will be considered in Section V. So, the code must
be designed to work with the vectors produced as output by
the feature extracting algorithm. Typically, such vectors have
length of the order of 10k bits.
Another important aspect is the modeling of the errors
affecting two vectors resulting from different biometric ac-
quisitions from the same individual. In [9], the errors are
modeled through a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with
transition probability p. We will adopt the same approach in
this paper. As it will be shown in the next section, typical
values of the percentage of different bits between the vectors
representing two acquisitions of the same biometric range
between 10% and 30%. So, we need codes with length about
10k bits that are able to correct such high fractions of errors
and, hence, have very low rate (R). Just to give an idea, a
BCH code with (n = 2047, k = 100), that is, rate R ≈ 0.05,
is able to correct 379 errors, which means it has a relative
error correcting capability of about 19%. A BCH code with
(n = 4095, k = 110), that is, rate R ≈ 0.03, is able to correct
767 errors, that is almost the same percentage. A similar value
is reached by the BCH code having (n = 8191, k = 170),
hence rate R ≈ 0.02, able to correct 1533 errors.
This evidences that, for classical algebraic codes, in order
to maintain a given relative error correcting capability, the
code rate must be decreased as the code length increases.
Furthermore, due to the long code length, decoding may also
yield complexity issues, although recent algorithms can reduce
the decoding complexity [10]. A smarter choice is represented
by modern iteratively decoded error correcting codes, like
Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes [11]. Actually, the
use of LDPC codes in this context has already been proposed
in [2], [9], [12], but the code design was not addressed in those
works. In summary, fuzzy hashing with LDPC codes brings
the following advantages:
• Fuzzy hashing reduces the amount of stored data, with
respect to the fuzzy commitment, since r < n.
• Fuzzy hashing reduces the predictability of the stored
strings, as shown at the end of the previous section.
• LDPC codes have greater error correction capabilities
than classical algebraic codes. Moreover, their relative
error correcting capability, for a fixed rate, is almost
constant as the code length increases.
• LDPC codes allow to reduce the size of the code repre-
sentation, by exploiting the sparse nature of H .
A. Code Design
We are interested in almost regular codes, since they allow
an easier implementation with respect to irregular codes; so,
we fix the column weight of the matrix H to be equal to
an integer dv . The row weight, for the code rate values here
of interest, cannot be constant as well. However, it will be
minimally dispersed around its mean 〈dc〉 = dv/(1 − R). If
we suppose that (as it occurs for all the codes we consider):
k
n
= R <
1
dv + 1
, (1)
the matrix H can have rows with only the following two values
of weight: dv and dv + 1. In this case, r − k · dv rows have
weight dv and the other k · dv rows have weight dv + 1.
We can describe the column and row weight distributions
of the matrix H through the polynomials λ(x) and ρ(x)
representing, respectively, the variable node and check node
degree distributions of the associated Tanner graph [11]. Since
we adopt the edge perspective, λi (ρi) denotes the fraction of
ones in the parity-check matrix H which are in columns (rows)
of weight i. Based on the hypotheses above, for the considered
ensemble of codes it results:
λ(x) = xdv−1,
ρ(x) = [1−R(1 + dv)]x
dv−1 +R(1 + dv)x
dv . (2)
Starting from (2), we can estimate the asymptotic performance
(that is, for n → ∞) of LDPC codes in this ensemble by
applying the density evolution method [11].
Gallager’s A algorithm [13] is an LDPC decoding algorithm
for the BSC channel that permits an easy characterization
through density evolution [14]. So, we have estimated its
convergence threshold (that is the maximum channel error
probability such that all the errors can be corrected using an
infinite length code) for the variable and check node degree
polynomials given by (2). Results are reported in Table I,
where the threshold values computed for dv = 3, 4, 5 are
provided, for code rates ranging between 0.1 and 0.01.
TABLE I
THRESHOLD VALUES FOR THE CONSIDERED LDPC CODES ENSEMBLES
UNDER GALLAGER’S A DECODING.
R dv = 3 dv = 4 dv = 5
0.1 0.159 0.078 0.045
0.09 0.163 0.079 0.045
0.08 0.166 0.08 0.046
0.07 0.169 0.081 0.046
0.06 0.173 0.083 0.047
0.05 0.177 0.084 0.048
0.04 0.18 0.085 0.048
0.03 0.184 0.087 0.049
0.02 0.188 0.088 0.05
0.01 0.192 0.089 0.051
As we observe from the table, the choice of a small value
of dv (like 3) should be preferred. On the other hand, the
asymptotic performance under Gallager’s A decoding is not
very good. For example, to reach a relative error correcting
capability of 19%, for dv = 3, a code rate smaller than 0.02
is required, that is similar to that needed by a BCH code with
n = 8191.
Gallager’s A algorithm allows an easy density evolution
analysis, that is useful to verify that LDPC codes can asymp-
totically reach the error correcting performance we need and
for which values of code rate. On the other hand, when dealing
with finite length codes, decoding algorithms with better
performance can be used. In fact, Gallager’s A algorithm is a
majority-based algorithm exploiting a fixed decision threshold
b, that is not the most effective choice. For example, adopting
a variable b (as in Gallager’s B algorithm) gives a first perfor-
mance improvement. Furthermore, several improved versions
of these algorithms have been proposed in the literature [15],
that are able to outperform Gallager’s original algorithms.
Finally, the classical Sum Product Algorithm (SPA) [16] can
also be applied on the BSC, even though, in absence of soft-
information from the channel, the initial likelihood associated
to each bit can assume only two opposite values. Despite this,
the SPA is able to significantly improve the error correction
performance with respect to that predicted in Table I, as we
will show in the next section, by providing some examples of
practical codes.
B. Examples
In this subsection we provide examples of LDPC codes
having parameters of interest in the fuzzy hashing context.
The codes have been designed through the Progressive Edge
Growth (PEG) algorithm [17], by imposing almost constant
column and row weights for their parity-check matrices. For
given column and row weights, the PEG algorithm allows to
design finite length LDPC codes with very good performance
under belief propagation decoding.
In detail, we first fix the column weight dv . Then, we impose
the lower triangular form for the parity-check matrices, in such
a way as to facilitate encoding, especially for very long codes.
This introduces a last column having weight 1, and some
columns having weight < dv. However, their incidence with
respect to the total number of columns is very small. Then,
the PEG algorithm is used to optimize the length of the local
cycles within the Tanner graph associated to each code, while
keeping the row weight distribution as much concentrated as
possible.
So, the characteristics of the codes we have designed are
well overlaid with those fixed in the previous subsection. The
codes mentioned above have been used to perform Montecarlo
simulations over the BSC, based on SPA decoding.
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Fig. 1. Performance of rate 0.1 LDPC codes with dv = 3 and dv = 5 over
the BSC with SPA decoding.
A first set of results is reported in Fig. 1, where LDPC codes
having n = 9600 and k = 1000 (hence, rate ≈ 0.1) have been
considered. We have designed two codes with different column
weights: dv = 3 and dv = 5. As we observe from the figure,
the simulation confirms that the code with dv = 3 has better
performance, in the waterfall region, with respect to the code
having dv = 5. This was expected on the basis of the results of
density evolution. However, we also observe that the code with
dv = 5 has a better performance in the error floor region, so
its Bit Error Rate (BER) and Frame Error Rate (FER) curves
tend to intersect with those of the first code. So, the choice
of dv = 3 is suitable if a failure rate on the order of 10−4 or
more is acceptable; otherwise, the choice of dv = 5 should be
preferred.
The performance improvement due to the SPA is evident:
both codes are able to achieve a rather low error rate for a
percentage of bit errors around 20%, or even more.
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Fig. 2. Performance of LDPC codes with dv = 3 and rate 0.05 and 0.02
over the BSC with SPA decoding.
To further increase the error correcting capability of these
codes, it is necessary to reduce their rate. To provide some
examples in this sense, we have considered k = 800 and
designed two other LDPC codes, having dv = 3 and rate 0.05
and 0.02 (that is, n = 16000 and n = 40000), respectively.
As we observe from their simulated performance, reported
in Fig. 2, by using the SPA, these codes are able to reach very
low error rates for a percentage of bit errors around 30% and
even more. Also in this case, the performance improvement
due to the SPA with respect to the theoretical performance
referred to Gallager’s A algorithm is evident.
These results confirm that LDPC codes are well suited for
the application in the considered context, in which a high
correction capability is needed. Furthermore, we can observe
that, in this study, we have limited ourselves to consider
almost regular codes, in order to keep their implementation
complexity low. The adoption of irregular LDPC codes can
result in a further performance improvement.
V. ENTROPY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the use of fuzzy hashing for
iris recognition and we study how the adoption of syndromes
affects some statistical properties of the biometric data. As
a feature extractor, we use the algorithm described in [18]
and available in [19], together with its associated matching
algorithm. In our simulations, we refer to the iris pattern
database known as CASIA V.1, provided by the Institute of
Automation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences [20].
Since the bits in iris templates are mutually dependent [21],
we should compute the entropy of a source with memory,
but this is computationally unfeasible for the sizes we are
dealing with. So, according to [21], [22], we evaluate the
discrimination entropy over both the sets of iris templates and
of their fuzzy hashes. For this purpose, we first compute the
distribution of the normalized Hamming distances between
all the couples of patterns within the set (of images of the
same iris or of images of different irises). Then, we compute
the mean µ and the standard deviation σ of the normalized
Hamming distance distribution. Finally, the discrimination
entropy (also known as “Degrees of Freedom” or DOF) is
obtained as DOF = µ(1− µ)/σ2.
Applying fuzzy hashing to an iris recognition framework
is not straightforward, due to the high variability in the
iris acquisition phase. In fact, we must try to avoid all the
differences given not only by the measure variability (i.e.,
scale and rotation), but also by the eye variability, that can
significantly change the amount of visible iris and its shape.
The standard way to take these issues into account is to
compute a mask describing which bits in the iris template
are free from such occlusions. The masks, in general, have
a different number of set bits for each iris reading, resulting
into information patterns having different lengths, both in the
case they describe different irises and different readings of the
same iris. This is not a problem in the case of the standard
matching algorithms, since we can take, as inputs for the
matching phase, the templates and masks of both the stored
iris and the one we want to check. Then, we can just compute
the union of the two masks and obtain the number of different
bits between the two templates, limited to the region excluded
from the union of the masks.
Instead, when we use syndromes, we cannot access the
reference template in clear; so, we must cope with different
lengths of the information patterns. One way is to treat the
matching channel as an error-and-erasure channel [12], where
erasures are given by the masks. However, in [12] the authors
use a different algorithm, while, in our case, the large number
of bits erased by the masks makes this approach unusable.
In order to obtain a fixed length of the information patterns,
we compute, for each template bit position i, the probability
m(i) that such bit is not erased by a mask. Then, we compute
a pseudomask selecting the bit positions corresponding to a
value of m(i) lower than a threshold: m(i) ≤ mth. In our
case, we fix mth = 2.4%.
We are aware that, with this approach, we may neglect
some bits that were not erased by their associated masks,
but we have verified that this has a very limited effect for
the considered algorithm. In fact, using all the selected bits
in each template, we obtain, between two different readings
of the same iris, an average Hamming distance of 28.24%, a
standard deviation σ = 0.0435 and a discrimination entropy
equal to 107 bits. Instead, using only the bits selected by
the pseudomask, we obtain an average Hamming distance of
26.2%, a standard deviation σ = 0.0486 and a discrimination
entropy equal to 81 bit. The explanation for this moderate
variation, in terms of discrimination entropy performance, is
that the feature extraction algorithm does not compute the
masks in the best possible way (for example the two eyelids
are approximated with straight lines and not with curves); so,
when we consider all the bits in each template, we introduce
some errors that afflict the result, that is, we take some bits
into account that we should actually erase.
We model the channel as BSC both in the case of intra-class
and inter-class comparisons. The use of a BSC model is further
justified by the fact that, by exploiting the considered feature
extraction algorithm and pseudomask, we have an experimen-
tal transition probability p1→0 = 0.257, p0→1 = 0.268 for
intra-class comparison and p1→0 = 0.480, p0→1 = 0.501 for
the inter-class case, thus confirming the (almost) symmetric
nature of the channel.
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Fig. 3. Inter-class analysis of the Hamming distance for the considered set
of iris templates with and without fuzzy hashing.
In order to show that the use of fuzzy hashing is able to
increase the discrimination entropy, that is to provide a better
protection against information leakage, we estimate the DOF
on the set of plain templates, before and after the application
of fuzzy hashing. The latter is performed through the LDPC
code having n = 9600, R = 0.1 and dv = 5, described in
the previous section. We compute the normalized Hamming
distance between each pair of templates created from different
irises and then estimate its probability density function. The
results are reported in Fig. 3.
The set of plain template vectors has µ = 0.4897, σ =
0.0281, hence DOF = 316.5. After performing fuzzy hashing,
the values become µ = 0.4932, σ = 0.0166, DOF = 907.1,
thus confirming the positive effect of fuzzy hashing.
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